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U.S. Interests In European Security
Following The Cold War

by

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Lieutenant, United States Air Force
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of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The need for U.S. involvement in European security affairs did not end with the Cold War. History provides evidence to support this. Periods in which the U.S. pursued neutralist or isolationist policies towards Europe resulted in instability on the continent. However, since 1949, the U.S. has pursued an alliance policy and Europe has experienced relative peace.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States must reevaluate its interests in Europe. These interests include the future of Russia, the stability of Eastern and Western Europe, the future of European security institutions, and a place at the European economic and political table for the U.S.

These interests must be kept in mind as the United States analyzes associated issues regarding further reductions in the defense budget and military presence in Europe. These issues include the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, the cost of U.S. involvement in the Atlantic Alliance, the search for a "peace dividend," and European support for a continued U.S. military presence on the continent. After examining these issues, the thesis concludes that further reductions in the U.S. defense budget and military presence in Europe must proceed at a responsible rate, if the U.S. is to avoid past mistakes and preserve European stability.

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Executive Summary

This thesis argues that the need for U.S. involvement in European security affairs did not end with the Cold War. History provides evidence to support this. Periods in which the U.S. pursued neutralist or isolationist policies towards Europe resulted in instability on the continent. However, since 1949, the U.S. has pursued an alliance policy and Europe has experienced relative peace.

Recent changes are forcing the United States to reevaluate its interests in Europe. The threat from the successor states of the Soviet Union seems almost non-existent, Germany is reunified, and the Warsaw Pact dismantled. United States interests include the future of Russia, the stability of Eastern and Western Europe, the future of European security institutions, and a place at the European economic and political table for the U.S.

These interests must be kept in mind as the United States analyzes associated issues regarding further reductions in the defense budget and military presence in Europe. These issues include the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, the cost of U.S. involvement in the Atlantic Alliance, the search for a "peace dividend," and European support for a continued U.S. military presence on the continent.

After examining these issues, this thesis concludes that further reductions in the U.S. defense budget and military presence in Europe must proceed at a responsible rate, if the U.S. is to avoid past mistakes and preserve European

stability. In the past, after major conflicts, the U.S. reduced its defense budget and security commitments to Europe without considering what effect these reductions would have on the quality and ability of its military forces. Keeping U.S. security interests in Europe in perspective while drawing down U.S. military force levels will be especially important in the coming years. Modern technology has made the world many times smaller. Strategic missiles and bombers are capable of striking targets deep within the heart of any continent. It is no longer possible for the United States to isolate itself from the rest of the world.

Some Americans favor making larger reductions to the U.S. military presence in Europe and the U.S. defense budget than what the Bush Administration's Base Force plan called for. They believe that further reductions are possible because the Soviet Union has collapsed and any future threat to the European continent appears to exist only in speculative and "what-if" scenarios. They also believe that, by spending less on defense, greater progress can be made in deficit reduction and in improvements to the U.S. economic situation. However, the U.S. should examine these judgements carefully before accepting them as support for further reductions beyond what President Bush has outlined.

It is important that the U.S. be steadfast during the transition that is taking place in Europe. 1989 was seen as a new beginning for Europe. The tendency might surface among impatient analysts or policy-makers to speed the process of change, regardless of the pitfalls that may be present. However, this attitude could endanger the stable transition to a free and prosperous Europe. After

peace dividends were harvested and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Europe, it would require massive effort and expense to return forces to Europe should it become necessary. Steps must be taken positively and decisively with an awareness that they cannot be easily reversed.

Though costly, America's European investment has yielded enormous benefits. It has provided years of peace on a continent that, in an ever-shrinking world, plays a critical role in the national security of the United States.

I. INTRODUCTION

There can be no such thing as Fortress America. If ever we were reduced to the isolation implied by that term we would occupy a prison, not a fortress.

- President Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the Union Message, January 9, 1959.¹

Recent changes are forcing the United States to reevaluate its policies regarding security in Europe. The threat from the successor states of the Soviet Union seems almost non-existent, Germany is reunified, and the Warsaw Pact dismantled. Should these changes cause the U.S. to reduce, beyond what the Bush Administration had planned, the defense budget and its involvement in European security affairs? According to Pat Buchanan, "For decades, we Americans have been carrying burdens and taking risks that belong to Europeans and they have exploited us."² Or should the United States continue with the current plan for reducing the defense budget its military presence and security commitment to Europe? If so, how should this approach be defined in terms of specific security interests and commitments?

¹Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1960), pp. 14-15.

²Patrick Buchanan, "Tripwire...or stabilizing nexus," Washington Times, May 5, 1990, p. F1.

The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the hypothesis that the need for U.S. involvement in European security affairs did not end with the Cold War. If this statement is true, several questions must be addressed.

- ▶ Can history provide evidence to support this thesis or is the post-Cold War security environment so different from that of the past that the new circumstances do not justify continuing U.S. involvement in European security affairs without further reductions beyond those currently planned?
- ▶ What are U.S. security interests in Europe now that the Cold War is over?
- ▶ To what extent is the presence of United States military forces still required in Europe?
- ▶ What are the main issues regarding a redefined U.S. involvement in European security affairs?
- ▶ To what extent are the views expressed by those calling for a further withdrawal of the U.S. from European security affairs based on unsound premises? To what extent are these views well-founded?

This thesis addresses these questions and offers a critical analysis of the views of those who advocate making reductions beyond those proposed by the Bush Administration to the U.S. military presence in Europe.

II. THE HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

AFFAIRS

With the end of the Cold War, is the United States faced with a break in history? Is the U.S. unable to base future security decisions on past experiences? What circumstances have caused the U.S. to change its security policy towards Europe in the past? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the history of U.S. involvement in European security affairs and the factors that influenced it. The history of American policy regarding European security affairs may be divided into four distinct periods. George Washington included the following remarks in his farewell address:

Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and property in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it...Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies....³

³David F. Long, ed., A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Relations (Washington: University Press of America, 1980), vol. I, From 1760 to the Mid-1980s, p. 24.

Washington's farewell address warned about the dangers of "entangling alliances" with Europe. Leaders in early American politics had observed that European alliances were quickly forged, only to be broken once one party had achieved its goals. Washington's address attempted to free the United States from the power politics that had dominated Europe for centuries and that was engulfing Europe at that time with the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

During this first period, "Europe was almost continually at war" and America "was effectively a European power." America was involved in Europe's politics, diplomacy, and wars. America's primary goals were to defend its "independence, territorial integrity, and commerce in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean."⁴ Therefore, with the power of Britain to the north and Spain to the south, the United States was forced to pursue a policy of neutrality instead of the isolationism Washington and other political leaders would have preferred. As Richard Henry Lee stated, "We are therefore compelled to mix with their [Europe's] Councils in order to be guarded against their ill designs."⁵ To achieve these goals, America developed a strong militia "to guard against European incursions and a small but

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests," Survival, January/February 1991, p. 4.

⁵Lee cited in Huntington, ibid., who indicates that the original source may be found in J. Fred Rippy, The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation, Smith College Studies in History, IX (Northampton, MA: 1924), pp. 125, 131.

capable Navy to protect American shipping against the depredations of the British Navy, French privateers and the Barbary pirates."⁶

As Huntington notes, "In 1815 the Napoleonic threat to Europe disappeared and a few years later European colonialism in the Americas came to an effective end." The first phase in U.S. foreign policy ended and the second phase, that of the *Pax Britannica*, began. "The United States was sheltered behind the British fleet and British diplomacy." The U.S., focusing on "continental expansion and economic development," adopted an isolationist foreign policy. The militia was replaced by "a small, long-service, active-duty, Indian-fighting Army." The Navy became less important and focused its operations on "combating the slave trade, protecting American merchantmen in Asia, and providing navigational support to commerce." America turned its focus away from European events.⁷

America used its geographic location to promote its isolationist foreign policy until the end of the century when the *Pax Britannica* phase ended and the third phase began.⁸ During this phase Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States became competing power centers. The small U.S. Navy was replaced by a large battle fleet that was second to none. The Army became stronger and larger. This was in part due to the establishment of a General Staff

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

and War College to develop contingency plans for a major war overseas and also to the creation of military reserves which could be mobilized to fight these wars.⁹

However, even with these changes, the United States wished to remain uninvolved in European security affairs. Even during most of World War I, the American public saw the war as caused by complicated politics and inter-governmental rivalries which were of no concern to the United States. George Kennan states that Americans dismissed the:

...real interests and aspirations of other peoples...as unsubstantial and unworthy of our attention, as 'jealousies and rivalries' too silly, too 'complicated', to deserve our respect.¹⁰

It was only after Germany's resumption of submarine warfare against American shipping and the Zimmermann telegram, relating attempts by Germany to form a German-Mexican alliance against the United States, that the U.S. saw it necessary to extend its democratic idea abroad and enter the war.¹¹

However, the end of World War I showed isolationism once again gaining political force. United States tendencies toward isolationism surfaced in the

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 64.

¹¹Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

nativist immigration laws of 1921 and 1924, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937, helped along by the depression at home and the rise of dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini in Europe, also reflected American attempts to turn inward and view events occurring in Europe as unimportant to the United States. In 1940, America was divided between "interventionists like Franklin Roosevelt, who wanted to aid Britain against Hitler's Germany, and isolationists like Charles Lindbergh, Joseph Kennedy and Robert Taft who wanted America to stand aside and live with whoever won."¹² As in World War I, it took a direct attack on American security interests to convince the U.S. that events abroad could affect the security of the United States. The U.S. was forced to abandon its isolationist policy and enter World War II.

The defeat of Germany and Japan set the scene for the fourth phase in U.S. policy regarding security in Europe. This phase was dominated by the Cold War. Isolationism gave way to internationalism. The primary U.S. goal during this phase was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence inside and outside Europe. The main U.S. strategy was containment. In order to promote this strategy, the U.S. had to remain involved in European security affairs. A complex system of alliances and security relationships was developed. The United States realized it could no longer afford to rely on relative geographic isolation as a hedge against European instability adversely affecting the security of the United States. During

¹²Michael Barone, "The American isolationist mirage," U.S. News & World Report, February 3, 1992, p. 29.

this period, the U.S. built a very large active-duty military; a massive strategic nuclear force; technological and qualitative superiority in weapons; and forward deployed land, sea, and air forces in Europe and Asia.¹³

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence achieved their objectives. The Cold War is over. 1991 marked the beginning of a new phase in the international system. With this new phase, the U.S. is faced with new options in its foreign policy decisions. What path will its foreign policy towards Europe take? With the threat from the East perceived by many as non-existent, isolationists are once again rallying around the battle cry of "America First." However, the past century has demonstrated that an isolationist approach by the U.S. toward European security does not promote stability in Europe. Twice, the outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major conflicts at great cost and loss of American lives. However, an internationalist U.S. approach to European security during the Cold War resulted in nearly a half century of peace - peace in the sense of an absence of major war - in Europe. This peace in Europe contributed to the security of the United States. It must be acknowledged, however, that another factor preventing the outbreak of war in Europe was Soviet Communist repression.

¹³Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests," p. 4.

Before arguments in favor of the U.S. withdrawing from Europe can be properly evaluated, it is necessary to look at current U.S. security interests in Europe.

III. U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS

There are two great tragedies in human existence: one is never to get one's dearest desire - the other is to get it.

- Oscar Wilde 1892¹⁴

Achieving one's objectives can be a dangerous thing. It requires one to make the decision of what to do next. The end of the Cold War brought with it an end to the driving sense of purpose that had influenced American security policy since the 1940s. The U.S. now faces a time that threatens to bring complacency, pride, and an abandonment of long-range political and strategic calculation. In order to not be overcome by this threat, it is necessary for the U.S. to reexamine its interests in European security in a post-Cold War world. In doing this, the U.S. would do well to keep Lord Palmerston's statement in mind that, "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies."¹⁵

Factors in Europe that could affect the security of the United States include the future of Russia, the security and stability of Eastern and Western Europe, and the future of European security institutions.

¹⁴Wilde cited in Norman J. Ornstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 2.

¹⁵Palmerston cited in Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 194.

A. THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA

In the coming years, the greatest potential for instability in the world will reside in the political, economic, and social fragmentation that is developing in the vacuum left by the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Although the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, its nuclear weapons remain. It is these weapons that present the United States with the only serious large-scale direct threat to its security.¹⁷ Therefore, the primary interest of the United States regarding Russia is to promote the emergence of a stable, democratic, and economically sound state. A Russia that is experiencing internal chaos while maintaining substantial conventional and strategic capabilities will be a loose nuclear cannon.

The road ahead for Russia is not an easy one. The challenges that lie ahead include:

- ▶ Drawing down its nuclear industry and preventing the technology, skills, and warheads from falling into the wrong hands.
- ▶ Ensuring that arms control agreements are kept.
- ▶ Preventing successor states of the Soviet Union from starting arms races with each other.

¹⁶Ibid., 209.

¹⁷Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, Toward a Stable Transition in Europe: A Conservative/Activist Strategy for the United States, Rand Corporation, August 1990, p. 5.

- Converting its massive military industry to productive civilian uses.¹⁸

While it is easy to be pessimistic about the future of Russia, successes have occurred. The Commonwealth states have agreed to place the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union under unified control. The four Commonwealth states which contain nuclear forces have declared their intention to implement Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) obligations. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have expressed their intention to become non-nuclear states. Furthermore, Russia is reducing its conventional military capabilities. Its military modernization programs are slowing down and Russia is diverting large amounts of military spending in an attempt to provide for its military personnel and their families. It is unlikely that a significant conventional challenge to European security will arise from Russia for many years to come. Even if a future militaristic Russia had intentions of this sort, it would be difficult for it to carry out these intentions. "The projected withdrawal of all forces of the former Soviet Union from East-Central Europe by 1994 and the independence of Ukraine and Belarus are expected to complicate fundamentally any hypothetical future planning by Moscow for aggression in Europe."¹⁹

¹⁸"Securing Europe's Peace," The Economist, February 15, 1992, p. 59.

¹⁹David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992 Draft, p. 15.

1. Prospects for Democracy

These positive developments are being overshadowed by the existence of dangerous trends within the former Soviet Union. Last year, Soviet GNP dropped by 15-20 percent. In an effort to address Russia's economic problems, President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian government are instituting radical programs of market-oriented reform including price liberalization, privatization of trade, services, farming, demonopolization, budget deficit reduction, and monetary reform.²⁰ Yeltsin and his government are determined to implement these programs with the understanding that they are the only path to a democratic and prosperous Russia. However, the reforms are drawing criticism from economists inside and outside Russia and are sure to cause short term pain for the Russian people.

While there is a possibility that reform will take hold in Russia and that Russia will successfully emerge from the Cold War as a democratic state aligned with Western interests, the stakes are high and the future is uncertain. The economic situation in Russia will be a key factor in defining the nature of the future regime in Moscow. History is against Russia in this respect as no one has ever successfully transformed a command-administrative system into a free

²⁰Dick Cheney, Statement Before The Senate Armed Services Committee In Connection With The FY 1993 Budget For The Department Of Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 31, 1992), p. 9.

market economy.²¹ If this attempt fails, the U.S. will be faced with new challenges to its security. A failed attempt at reforms within Russia could lead to an authoritarian, remilitarized Russia that might attempt to reverse the process of democracy in Eastern Europe. If an armed conflict were to occur between Russia and Ukraine or between Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union, it could lead to ecological disasters; large refugee flows to Western Europe; and a threat to the security of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; as well as a breakdown in the control of nuclear weapons within Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union.²²

2. Political and Military Implosion

Although the forces of change in Russia bring the potential for the emergence of a new Western ally, the possibility of a political and military implosion within the former Soviet Union cannot be excluded. The Soviet Army is still large and heavily armed. It is the only remaining Soviet institution still functioning. However, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is an army without a country. It has no clear mission or chain of command. Its officer corps is frustrated and discontented. They are frustrated by the waning lack of prestige, living standards, and social welfare programs for the military. A popular slogan

²¹Ibid., 13.

²²Ibid.

among the military has become: "If the politicians do not decide the fate of the army, the army will decide the fate of the politicians."²³

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney spoke before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1992 of the dangers of a "Weimar Russia." Cheney discussed the dangers that could result from the failure of Russian efforts towards democratic and free market policies. An authoritarian leader might assume power and rearm Russia much as Hitler did with Germany in the 1930s. The potential for this sort of outcome exists because Russia faces an economic situation that may not be reparable in time to avoid political, social, and military implosion, caused by divisions within the military, the existence of reactionary ideologies and ethnic resentments, along with nostalgia for Russia's lost empire.²⁴

B. SECURITY AND STABILITY OF EASTERN EUROPE

The threat of Soviet intervention was a dam placed against pressing waters. When this dam cracked, it was the pent-up waters that overran its remains.²⁵

²³Ibid., 12.

²⁴Ibid., 13.

²⁵Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' becomes the 'South'," PS:Political Science and Politics (Washington, DC), March 1991, pp. 20-24.

The failed Soviet coup of August 1991 was a victory for democratic forces worldwide. It accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union and helped to oust Communism from power. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, the world has experienced the most dramatic changes in international boundaries since the end of World War II. Thus, deterring Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe is no longer the challenge at hand. Instead, the challenge is establishing positive relations with the successor states of the Soviet Union and the East European countries formerly under Soviet control.²⁶

In determining American interests toward the newly independent states of Eastern Europe, it should be understood that it is the individual states and not the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which should be the primary focus of U.S. attention. Regardless of what Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk thinks about the chances of CIS survival, or Russian President Boris Yeltsin's hope that the CIS will be more than a formula for "civilized divorce," it is apparent that the CIS will not become a cohesive successor state to the USSR. The CIS does not have a government, a constitution, a central bank, or any enforcement mechanism to implement its decisions. The armed forces of the Commonwealth are in disarray and some states, including Russia, are moving toward creating their own military units. In addition, if some post-Soviet states achieve their desire to create

²⁶David S. Yost, May 1992 draft, p. 19.

their own currency, the CIS will no longer have a common monetary system.²⁷ Therefore, the U.S. should design its policies toward the individual states of the former Soviet Union.

U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe should be to promote the emergence of stable, democratic, and economically sound independent states. These goals are valid, if for no other reason, than to insure that a neo-imperial Russia will not be tempted to meddle in Eastern Europe's affairs.²⁸ However, as in the case of Russia, the accomplishment of these policy goals will not be easy.

1. Ethnic Conflict Within the Former Soviet Union

Part of the reason for the difficult task which lies ahead for the newly formed states of Eastern Europe is the line that resembles a geologic fault that runs from the Caspian to the Adriatic between cultures of Islamic and Christian origin. This reference to cultural heritage is not meant to imply religious devotion but to suggest a force that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, will continue to influence politics and culture in the area it transversed in Eastern Europe, notably in Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus.²⁹ This fault line, along with the relaxation of past Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, has released long-

²⁷Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 75.

²⁸Ibid., 87.

²⁹John A. Armstrong, "Nationalism in the Former Soviet Empire," Problems of Communism, Jan-Apr 1992, p. 121.

suppressed ethnic tensions. As a result of wars and migrations, there are no ethnically homogeneous states in Eastern or Central Europe. Before the fall of communism, these simmering problems of nationalism had not been evident. Now that communism has been overthrown, the oppressed nations and minorities are seeking self-determination.³⁰ The possibility of democracy and free market economies in this region is therefore being complicated by the increased risk of conflicts between the new states and civil strife.³¹

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the world lost the primary enforcer of stability in Eastern Europe. The sources of regional violence, which include nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and economic and social inequality, continued to exist during the Cold War but were controlled by the "system of accommodating regional crises within a structure of global stability" provided by the existence of two functioning superpowers. Now that the Soviet Union has disappeared, regional conflicts could become more difficult to contain and could produce dangerous consequences for the international balance of power.³²

³⁰Dr. Geza Jeszenszky, "Nothing quiet on the Eastern front," NATO Review, June 1992, p. 7.

³¹David S. Yost, May 1992 Draft, p. 17.

³²Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 204.

2. Economic Collapse

With the economic collapse of the old Soviet system, the threats to reformers striving for stable democracies are multiplying daily. Reconstructing economies that have failed as a result of inherent faults is more difficult than reconstructing after the devastation of war.³³ The Russian winter could once again influence history's course as it did in 1812, 1917, and 1941. As the economy's performance continues to deteriorate, the onset of cold weather could make the already desperate food, medicine, and energy shortages worse.³⁴ Undesirable political forces may be waiting for an opportunity to exploit the chaos and provide a promise of order to an already frustrated and exhausted people.³⁵

3. Prospects for Democracy

The prospects for democracy in the newly formed states of Eastern Europe remain uncertain. The best chances for the appearance of stable democracies lie in the East Central European states of the northern Tier including former East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.³⁶ A more difficult

³³Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has to be Done," address at Princeton University, December 12, 1991, p. 5.

³⁴Ibid., 12.

³⁵James A. Baker III, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What has to be Done," address at Princeton University, December 12, 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992 Draft, p. 16.

³⁶John A. Armstrong, p. 125.

task lies in establishing democracies in the independent countries of Southeastern Europe. These countries face potentially disruptive border issues and internal ethnic conflicts.³⁷ If democracy can mature in the former Soviet Union, there is a good chance it will become a force of peace in Europe and other critical regions. However, should any one state alter its democratic course in favor of fascism or some other authoritarian regime, it could threaten progress towards democracy in its neighbors.³⁸

If reform in the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet Republics is successful, it would provide many advantages to the United States. It would reduce the U.S. defense needs, the threat of nuclear war, the risk of disadvantages arms exports, and reduce the risk of environmental disaster. In addition it would provide economic benefits to the U.S. by opening large new markets to U.S. exports and promote world economic growth.³⁹

Secretary of State James A. Baker III summarized the position the U.S. finds itself in towards the former Soviet Union:

Today, after the Cold War, we again stand at history's precipice. If during the Cold War we faced each other as two scorpions in a bottle, now the

³⁷ibid., 126.

³⁸Dick Cheney, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, p. 14.

³⁹Lee H. Hamilton, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 43.

Western nations and the former Soviet republics stand as awkward climbers on a steep mountain. Held together by a common rope, a fall toward fascism or anarchy in the former Soviet Union will pull the West down, too. Yet equally as important, a strong and steady pull by the West now can help them to gain their footing so that they, too, can climb above to enduring democracy and freedom. Surely we must strengthen the rope, not sever it.⁴⁰

When the size of the region, its strategic location, the wealth of its natural resources, and the fact that it is still home to nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons and the most powerful conventional forces ever amassed in Europe are taken into consideration, it is obvious that events there will have a dramatic effect on the outside world. The United States, the only remaining global superpower, has a large stake in the outcome. There is no use in imagining a benign new world order if America has to contend with a post-Soviet civil war or a resurgent Russian empire.⁴¹

C. SECURITY AND STABILITY OF WESTERN EUROPE

Twice this century, wars on the European continent have involved the United States. Since the formation of NATO and the establishment of a U.S. military presence in Europe, major armed conflicts in Europe have been avoided. United States interests in post-Cold War Europe include the continuation of peaceful and

⁴⁰Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has to be Done," pp. 13-14.

⁴¹Dimitri K. Simes, p. 73.

cooperative relations among the West European countries and continued U.S. influence in European security affairs.

1. Collective Security

Promotion of the idea of collective security has created a psychological situation in which the United States cannot turn its back on the concept, not because of what collective security can accomplish...but because of what millions of people...believe it may accomplish in time. Collective security has come to be the chief symbol of hope that...a community of nations will develop in which there will be no more war.

- Arnold Wolfers⁴²

Proposals for a European collective security system have been emerging in the post-Cold War security environment of Europe. However, instead of collective security, advocates of such a system sometimes use the terms "overarching security system," "pan-European security," "co-operative security," or "expanded CSCE."⁴³ While the names differ, the idea goes back to an ancient concept. In fact, if it were traced back to its roots, credit for the idea would probably go to Alexandre Dumas whose *Three Musketeers* first used the rule "one for all, and all for one."⁴⁴

⁴²Arnold Wolfers, cited in Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" International Security, Summer 1992, p. 5.

⁴³Josef Joffe, "Collective security and the future of Europe: failed dreams and dead ends," Survival, Spring 1992, p. 36.

⁴⁴Ibid.

One crucial distinction must be made when discussing the prospects of a collective security system. The terms "collective defense" and "collective security" should not be used interchangeably. "Collective defense is another word for alliance."⁴⁵ It implies a relationship where A+B+C are allied against a known aggressor Z. NATO is an example of such an alliance. On the other hand, collective security has no predetermined enemies. Theoretically, all members of the collective security pact would live together in peace until one day one or more among them disturbed this peace. At this point, all the other members of the system would unite to thwart this aggression in the form of sanctions, diplomatic condemnation, and ultimately military action. Its relationship is also A+B+C against Z. However, it is not known whether Z is actually A,B,or C above; Z might be one of the very members that has sworn to uphold the peace of the collective security system.⁴⁶

Why is the idea of creating a collective security system gaining political force? One reason is that the end of the Cold War has brought a marked decrease in the level of suspicion that exists in international politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United Nations is no longer paralyzed by two superpowers with competing national interests.⁴⁷ Peace is beginning to appear

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective Security in Europe and Asia (Strategic Studies Institute,

normal. Collective security is generating interest in itself more by default than anything else. NATO seems outdated because an alliance without an adversary seems pointless and "unilateralism seems ineffective or illegitimate."⁴⁸

According to Richard Betts, enthusiasm for collective security is encouraged by "confusion about which is the cause and which is the effect in the relation between collective security and peace, and by conflation of present security conditions (absence of a threat) with future security functions (coping with a threat)."⁴⁹ This confusion raises questions about whether a collective security system will actually accomplish what its name implies. Will collective security function only in conditions where it is not needed? As the security requirements of its members change, will these changes prevent collective security from working? Will the possibility of war increase and the ability to cope with threats become less significant than if a different security system had been used?⁵⁰

What if collective security works the way it is expected to? By working according to its design, it will create *more* military instability instead of less. By forcing states to become involved when it is not in their best interest, a commitment to collective security could result in minor wars becoming major ones. Creating equal military power among states through arms control without

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1992), p. 7.

⁴⁸Richard K. Betts, p. 15, emphasis in the original.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁰Ibid.

considering their alignment during a potential crisis could create unequal military forces engaged in a conflict against one another.

A collective security system should not be considered a replacement for NATO. If a collective security system is used as a replacement for NATO and doesn't work, the action taken against a rogue country might be weaker than what could have been undertaken by NATO if it had been maintained.⁵¹ Since a collective security system is not designed to deter a specific threat, it will not be a continually functioning system like NATO as many people currently believe.⁵² Furthermore, the establishment of a collective security system is reliant upon states subordinating their own interests to general or remote ones. The ability of states to perform in this manner has yet to be confirmed by experience.⁵³

Experience is the only way to prove collective security works since testing it poses problems. First, there is no way to simulate the function of a collective security system or perform test runs. Therefore, "trial by fire" is the only way to see if the system will work. However, if it fails to function properly, the system's first test could be its last. Furthermore, it would be impossible to know when a test to the integrity of the system occurred. If there is never a challenge to the system, it could be argued that the system worked. However, this cannot

⁵¹Ibid., p. 20.

⁵²Ibid., p. 13.

⁵³Ibid., p. 12.

be proven without knowing if a challenge would have occurred in the absence of the collective security system.⁵⁴

Regardless of its definition or function, the concept of collective security has failed Europe in the past and it will continue to do so in the future. Several criticisms exist against the idea of collective security. The main criticism of collective security is that states fail to live up to the guarantee of united action against any would-be aggressor. This situation is further aggravated by collective security taking away the ability of states to act independently of each other.⁵⁵ This results in no substantial action being taken against an aggressor state. Another problem with collective security is that it is often difficult to assign blame in a conflict in order to decide which state is the aggressor and is to be acted against. A third problem is stated by Henry Kissinger:

No arrangement would be more likely to create conditions in which one nation can dominate. For if everybody is allied with everybody, nobody has a special relationship with anybody. It is the ideal situation for the most ruthless seeking to isolate potential victims.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁶Henry A. Kissinger, "Germany, Neutrality and the Security System Trap," Washington Post, April 15, 1990, p. D7.

If Western Europe still requires an organization to guarantee its security, NATO is the only security structure, existing or planned, that has proven itself capable of protecting West European security and U.S. interests in Europe.

2. The U.S. Nuclear Guarantee

The U.S. has played a major role in promoting stable relations among the countries of Western Europe. A significant part of this role has involved the U.S. nuclear guarantee to European security. It is important that the U.S. continue to offer a credible security guarantee. Without the U.S. guarantee, "the weak would once more worry about the strong, and the strong-such as Great Britain, France, and West Germany-would once more worry about one another."⁵⁷

Are nuclear weapons still necessary to insure European security? Some might argue that nuclear weapons are no longer useful. United States nuclear weapons were placed in Europe to prevent a hostile Soviet Union from achieving its expansionistic goals. The purpose in deploying the weapons was to deter a Soviet threat of blackmail or aggression.

However, just as the situation within Europe and the former Soviet Union has changed, so have the reasons for providing Europe with a nuclear guarantee. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the potential still exists for certain political factions to mobilize its remaining conventional and nuclear

⁵⁷Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, Spring 1984, p. 75.

forces for their interests.⁵⁸ While present trends point to an end to the East-West military confrontation in Europe, there is still a remote possibility that these positive trends might be derailed.⁵⁹

Even if trends in the former Soviet Union continue on a positive course, Russia will still be the biggest power in Europe. It will also be bordered by difficult neighbors to the south and east. For that reason alone it will maintain capable conventional and nuclear forces. Therefore, Europe will continue to require nuclear deterrence next to this neighbor.⁶⁰

Another difficulty resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union is that Europe is now home to more nuclear states. Large quantities of conventional and nuclear weapons are spread throughout the former Soviet Union. There are roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons, including 2,600 strategic weapons deployed in Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. There are also 40,000 metric tonnes of chemical agents stockpiled in Russia.⁶¹ While it appears that the majority of these weapons will be destroyed or placed under central control by Moscow, nothing is certain until this process has been completed.

⁵⁸Baker on December 12, 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992, p. 16.

⁵⁹"German Perspectives on NATO and European Security," National Security Research Inc., August 1991, p. 33.

⁶⁰Pierre Lellouche, "Winner Give All," Newsweek, October 21, 1991.

⁶¹Ivo Daalder, "The Future of Arms Control," Survival, Spring 1992, p. 54.

Even if the nuclear weapon situation within the former Soviet Union is under control, the technology to create nuclear weapons cannot be destroyed. The risk of this technology falling into the wrong hands increases daily. A growing number of states can now export material, equipment, technology, and services needed to develop nuclear weapons. Many analysts are afraid these new suppliers, especially ones that don't adhere to the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation, will undermine non-proliferation efforts.⁶²

Supply is not the only side of the nuclear proliferation problem. Increasing numbers of Third World countries are seeking to meet their nuclear demands. A number of Middle Eastern and North African states are currently seeking intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear program, discovered by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, is an excellent example of the nuclear proliferation problem.⁶³ Furthermore, recent reports have suggested that certain Middle Eastern countries intend to recruit former Soviet nuclear scientists to assist them in developing their own nuclear programs. Robert Gates believes,

The tens of thousands of scientists and engineers associated with Soviet weapons programs constitute a potentially dangerous "brain drain" from the former Soviet republics. Only a fraction of these

⁶²William C. Potter, "The New Nuclear Suppliers," Orbis, Spring 1992, p. 199.

⁶³Thomas-Durell Young, "The Need for NATO-Europe's Substrategic Nuclear Weapons," Orbis, Spring 1992, p. 231.

specialists can actually design nuclear weapons or run a program to develop and produce biological weapons. But we know from experience that small numbers of key people count. Most of the potential emigrants will stay home and work for the betterment of their homeland, and others would prefer to settle in the West. Some, however, may be tempted to sell their expertise to Third World countries trying to acquire or improve special weapons capabilities.⁶⁴

Because of the lingering threat of a resurgent hostile force within the former Soviet Union, the continued existence of large numbers of nuclear weapons within Russia and its bordering states, and the regional and global nuclear threat that still exists, U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities are still necessary. Furthermore, since the security of Europe affects the security of the United States, the U.S. has a continued interest in providing this nuclear guarantee. Therefore, it remains in the interest of the U.S. to prevent non-nuclear countries of Europe from being coerced by blackmail from Russia or any other nuclear state.⁶⁵

With significantly reduced conventional and nuclear forces, can the U.S. continue to offer a credible nuclear guarantee to Europe? Some Europeans want to know how continued nuclear threats to Europe can be prevented when the

⁶⁴Robert Gates, Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 22, 1992, p. 9.

⁶⁵Beatrice Heuser, "What Nuclear Strategy For Post-Cold War Europe," Orbis, Spring 1992, p. 213.

United States is withdrawing the majority of its nuclear weapons from the continent.⁶⁶

Granted, a certain level of tangible commitment to Europe is necessary in order to provide a credible nuclear guarantee. However, it is incorrect to say the U.S. has reduced or will reduce its forces below this level. Deterrence is not just a function of numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. Deterrence is also a function of the enemy's belief that a potential victim will be defended in case of attack.⁶⁷ The United States has interests in European security that go beyond the presence of American forces on European soil. European instability runs the risk of becoming American insecurity. The U.S. can no longer isolate itself from Europe as it has in the past. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to insure European stability by providing its allies with a credible nuclear guarantee regardless of current reductions being made to its conventional and nuclear forces.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has argued that a disengagement of the U.S. from commitments to its European allies might result in destabilization by encouraging nuclear proliferation. He further stated that, "I would think [that] if the United States cuts back so much that all we can do and all we can talk about is defending the continental United States, we'll create an incentive for other

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 221.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 220.

nations that do not now feel the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals to do so."⁶⁸

3. German Questions

Germany's redefined role in Europe could create a challenge to the future stability of the European continent. A reunited Germany will grow into a major economic and military power in the new Europe. Soon the Germans could ask for the political power they feel their economic and military power entitle them to.⁶⁹ According to Josef Joffe, Germany is "too strong to be left alone, too weak to go it alone."

If the past hundred years are a guide, Germany has done best when anchored to a community. Germany-and Europe-have done worst whenever Germany was left to its own devices or treated as an outcast.⁷⁰

Germany is even somewhat apprehensive about its recent unification. The Economist reports that:

⁶⁸Dick Cheney, August 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 74.

⁶⁹Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," International Herald Tribune, March 2, 1992, p. 5.

⁷⁰Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," p. 46.

Curiously, among those who fear Germany the most are the Germans themselves. With unity, Germany is suddenly bigger, potentially bolder and drawn to the east as well as to the west. German leaders are anxious to avoid the follies of the past. They want to bind their country securely into the community - to create a European Germany, they say, not a German Europe. Better do the tethering soon, they say darkly; in a few years the beast will be stronger, wilder, possibly untameable.⁷¹

Being a non-nuclear state, Germany has always viewed nuclear weapons as political instruments rather than military ones. It has thought in terms of deterrence rather than nuclear defense.⁷² However, it may be wrong to believe that Germany would never seek to become a nuclear power. If the U.S. nuclear guarantee was brought into question, Germany might be forced into a corner on this issue. It is doubtful that Germany would rely on a British or French guarantee in place of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Furthermore, with Russia and possibly some of the other successor states retaining nuclear weapons, Germany will likely see the need for continued nuclear deterrence. The question is whether this nuclear guarantee will be American or German.⁷³

⁷¹"The German Question," The Economist, October 12, 1991, p. 18.

⁷²Stephen F. Szabo, "Beyond the Cold War: Current Issues in European Security," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 1990, p. 7.

⁷³Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured World," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America, (New York, Plenum Press, 1992), p. 63.

However, for the present, German leaders will likely continue to feel Germany's political and economic interests are best served by being involved in some form of alliance structure. Stephen F. Szabo relates that:

In the security area all indications are that future German governments will continue to see a multinational context as the most conducive to their interests. German security based on German means alone would result in more insecurity, both for Germans and their neighbors. German leaders are likely to continue to recognize that both their security and their broader political and economic interest are best served through post-national approaches.⁷⁴

Keeping Germany tied with the United States in the post-Cold War period is very important. Dick Cheney states:

Germany's clearly one of the major power houses in the world. Maintaining that close relationship between [Germany and] the United States -- from a security standpoint, but also in terms of our economic and political ties -- I think is very important...the future, in terms of stability in Europe, depends very much on that relationship.⁷⁵

Bad memories of a militaristic Germany linger in the minds of many Europeans. "Not only in Europe but also around the world, enduring memories of World War II still limit Germany's ability to play a role commensurate with its economic power

⁷⁴Stephen F. Szabo, p. 18.

⁷⁵Dick Cheney cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 11.

and geopolitical importance."⁷⁶ Many Europeans view NATO and the EC as a means of providing reassurance that Germany will not see any need to develop "an autonomous security policy or perceive any need to seek military power commensurate with its economic strength."⁷⁷ This European view includes preventing Germany from feeling the need to develop its own nuclear deterrent force.⁷⁸

American views of the German question are different from those among some Europeans. "Unlike some of its European allies, the United States has had no significant reservations in championing German unity and national self-determination over the decades, though the United States has naturally been interested in encouraging the united Germany to remain fully committed to the Atlantic Alliance."⁷⁹ Some U.S. observers judge that strong ties with Germany will "promote European-American cooperation in meeting the political, economic, and security challenges of the future."⁸⁰ Indeed, according to Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.),

⁷⁶Richard Nixon, "Is America a Part of Europe," National Review, March 2, 1992, p. 30.

⁷⁷David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 10.

⁷⁸The Economist, 1 September 1990, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 10.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., 11.

Throughout this century, when U.S. security policy has been rooted firmly in Germany, there has been peace in Europe. When it has been rooted in London, or London and Paris, there has been war.⁸¹

D. EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

The security of Europe in the post-Cold War world will, it is hoped, be assured by a broad range of organizations that bring parties in Europe together to further order and stability. The organizations currently pursuing this goal include NATO (complemented by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council), WEU, CSCE, and the EC.

1. NATO

NATO has been and will continue to be the primary pillar for European security.⁸² NATO has helped to create a feeling of security in the minds of many Europeans largely due to the fact that it has been the principal link between North America and Europe.⁸³ Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to preserve the Atlantic Alliance and to continue to support U.S. commitments to European security. Regardless of the changes that have occurred in Europe recently, the U.S. role as an outside balancer and protector of European security will continue to be important in the years to come.

⁸¹Lieutenant General William E. Odom, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 11.

⁸²Emilio Colombo, "European security at a time of radical change," NATO Review, June 92, p. 3.

⁸³Otto Pick, "Reassuring Eastern Europe," NATO Review, June 92, p. 30.

However, NATO's role will obviously change during the 1990's. Due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the decline in Moscow's power, the degree of U.S. influence in certain alliance decisions may be reduced.⁸⁴ Furthermore, with calls being heard for a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe and a greater emphasis on domestic needs at home, the United States is likely to emphasize that a greater share of the financial burden for defending shared European security interests be assumed by its allies.⁸⁵ In April 1991, President Bush said,

Whether it's the European Community, or a broadened mandate for the CSCE, the U.S. supports all efforts to forge a European approach to common challenges on the Continent and in the world beyond, with the understanding that Europe's reciprocal, more mature security relationships will be more sustainable over time. We will expect our allies to share with us the burden of leadership.⁸⁶

While U.S. officials see increased roles for the EC, WEU, and CSCE in the coming years, they do not feel that these roles should be pursued at the expense of NATO's traditional missions. In February 1991, William H. Taft IV, the U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, said, "We support a

⁸⁴David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 39.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁸⁶President Bush, April 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 41.

European pillar, but one that does not duplicate the Alliance, one that operates within the Alliance to do Alliance tasks and outside the Alliance only where it wishes to take on new missions."⁸⁷ The overall U.S. policy on the establishment of European security institutions can be summed up by Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney,

...it should be done in a way that doesn't undermine or weaken NATO. I find that position is generally supported by all of our European allies and most especially by the nations of Eastern Europe.⁸⁸

2. The European Community

The U.S. welcomes the efforts by the European Community to establish a unified Europe. It also favorably views European efforts to make the WEU NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the EC. President Bush applauded efforts toward European unity at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 when he said,

The United States has long supported European unity because of our strong conviction that it was good for Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, and

⁸⁷William H. Taft IV, February 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 42.

⁸⁸Dick Cheney, August 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 44.

good for the world...A more united Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities.⁸⁹

At the same time the President reaffirmed the fact that "NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the Allies under the Washington Treaty."⁹⁰

However, it appears that the EC may be in turbulent waters. Efforts by the EC to establish a single currency and to adopt common foreign and security policies have run into problems after a Danish referendum resulted in a 'no' vote in June 1992. The French only narrowly approved the treaty in September 1992. While the U.S. favors a united Europe and the advantages it could offer to the Atlantic Alliance, it may have a while yet to wait.

3. CSCE

Initial U.S. assessments did not view the CSCE as having an important role in the new Europe. However, the U.S. has recently been placing an increased emphasis on the security functions of the CSCE.⁹¹ Originally, it was feared that an all-European security arrangement could threaten NATO. However,

⁸⁹President Bush, December 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 44.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," p. 46.

it is hoped that the CSCE will be able to help promote democracy, economic liberalization, and a peaceful transition in Eastern Europe.⁹² The U.S. government has realized that membership in NATO for Russia and other successor states of the USSR is not politically practical any time soon and therefore sees the desirability of utilizing the CSCE as a diplomatic framework.⁹³ Furthermore, the U.S. holds that the CSCE should be developed to ease ethnic and national tensions and to resolve conflicts in Eastern Europe. The U.S. wants to find ways to strengthen the CSCE's crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities.⁹⁴

While the U.S. supports European efforts to establish a European defense identity, it is apparent that NATO's role of guaranteeing the defense of Western Europe is secure for the time being. Neither the EC or the CSCE is a likely vehicle for a European defense structure. The Gulf war was a reminder that close integration with a powerful ally has its benefits. NATO, during this period of rapid transition in Europe, has been a reassuring comfort to those involved just by being there.⁹⁵

However, for NATO to weather the coming years, certain problems will have to be resolved in its favor.

⁹²Ibid., p. 47.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 49.

⁹⁵"Securing Europe's Peace," The Economist, February 15, 1992, p. 60.

- ▶ Will NATO expand to the East and allow the newly formed independent states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, to join the alliance?
- ▶ Will NATO become further involved in peace-keeping missions in Eastern Europe to help contain and resolve disputes among the nationalities in that region?
- ▶ Since many future threats to European security will include multi-faceted, multi-directional threats to allied security from Eastern European instability, nuclear proliferation, and aggressors to Europe's south, how will NATO resolve the out-of-area question?⁹⁶

It would be foolish to think that military threats to Europe have disappeared. However, it is harder to identify them. The front line in Central Europe is gone. By 1995 there could be fewer than 100,000 American troops on European soil.⁹⁷ In this time of uncertainty, there are few threats imaginable that Europeans could meet as effectively without America's military help and logistical support. However, this should not dissuade Europeans from organizing their own defense contributions. These contributions could encourage the United States to remain involved and continue to hold up its end of the alliance at a time when financial costs are becoming increasingly important.

The distinction must be drawn, however, when these contributions start competing with NATO instead of complementing it. NATO's commitment to European freedom has been the foundation that European prosperity and stability have been built upon. The U.S. military presence has given West Europeans the

⁹⁶North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's new strategic concept," North Atlantic Council meeting communique, Rome, November 7, 1991, pp. 3-4.

⁹⁷"Securing Europe's Peace," p. 60.

reassurance and security they needed in order to calm their past rivalries. In this respect, NATO has not only been advantageous for the peace and stability of Europe, but, in light of the fact that European instabilities have involved the U.S. in undesirable situations in the past (notably World War I and World War II), it has been a source of peace and stability for the United States.⁹⁸

E. A PLACE AT THE EUROPEAN TABLE

The U.S. will have a continued interest in the wide variety of political and economic decisions that will be made in the post-Cold War Europe. Just as the speed with which the Soviet Union collapsed came as a surprise, events in Europe and the world continue to move quickly. There are a wide variety of possible events that could occur in which the United States will have a vested interest.

The U.S. is tied to Europe. If these bonds are loosening in the military realm, they are ever tightening in the economic realm. The European economies are headed toward integration. This integration will add to the productive capability of Europe. European stability will benefit the European economy. U.S. pocketbooks are tied to Europe's pocketbooks. Therefore, what benefits the European economy will benefit the American economy. On the other hand,

⁹⁸"Why NATO?" The Economist, May 23, 1992, p. 15.

instability in Europe would hurt its economic performance. This instability would flow across the Atlantic and run the danger of becoming American instability.⁹⁹

Currently, the U.S. commitment to NATO and the U.S. military forces deployed in Europe give the United States a voice in European security matters. By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. military presence in Europe may be much less than what it is currently. Therefore, in a Europe that may act with greater cohesion than it has in the past, the U.S. may be forced to accept a reduced role in defining the course of events. It is nonetheless important that the U.S. continues to influence the course of events in Europe. The U.S. should strive to maintain a place at the European table in order to maintain a voice in European affairs that affect U.S. security and stability.¹⁰⁰

Although the Cold War is over, the U.S. continues to have interests in European security affairs. It is crucial that these interests be adequately defined if the United States is to successfully pursue a national security strategy for a post-Cold War world.

⁹⁹Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, p. 9.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

IV. ANALYZING KEY ISSUES

Since Washington delivered his farewell address, modern technology has made the world many times smaller. Strategic missiles and bombers are capable of striking targets deep within the heart of any continent. It is no longer possible for the United States to isolate itself from the rest of the world.

Some Americans nonetheless favor making larger reductions to the U.S. military presence in Europe and in the size of the defense budget than what the Bush Administration's Base Force plan called for. They believe further reductions are possible since the Soviet Union has collapsed and that any future threats to U.S. interests on the European continent appear to exist only in speculative and "what-if" scenarios. They also believe that, by spending less on defense, greater progress can be made in deficit reduction and in the U.S. economic situation.

It should be noted that there is a broad spectrum of opinion on how large cuts in defense spending and reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe should be. Some extremes exist. But the views of most members of Congress can be found somewhere in the middle. This middle is dominated by the belief that reductions should be made in the defense budget and in the U.S. military presence in Europe beyond what President Bush's Base Force Plan called for.

However, in light of the current economic situation, it is also generally conceded, these reductions should be instituted at a responsible rate.

The desire for larger cuts in defense spending is not restricted to one party. Members of both the Democratic and Republican parties are calling for further reductions. Furthermore, with the exception of Congressmen Aspin, Kennedy, Glenn, and a handful of others, few in Congress have suggested specific numbers regarding what the U.S. military presence in Europe or the defense budget should be reduced to.

The purpose of this section will be to examine the central issues being raised to support further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe and the defense budget. Every attempt will be made to avoid a "straw man" approach in raising and examining the issues presented below.

A. DOES EUROPE STILL NEED A U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE?

This view is supported by reference to changed circumstances. If the Soviets no longer pose a threat, to what extent should the United States continue to guarantee the security of NATO Europe? Forces of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are withdrawing from East European bases. With them they are taking a large part of the threat that has faced Western Europe since 1945. Once these former Soviet military forces have left, it is unlikely that they will return any time soon. The economy of the FSU is weak. Politically, the FSU is in danger of swinging between civil strife and the reestablishment of strong central control by

an authoritarian leadership. It is unlikely that in its weakened condition the FSU could support a military machine powerful enough to invade Eastern Europe or to threaten Western Europe at any time in the near future.¹⁰¹ While he doesn't advocate a complete withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, Senator James R. Sasser believes greater reductions to U.S. troop levels in Europe can be made. Furthermore, he believes it is time for U.S. allies to begin paying their fair share of the European defense burden. Senator Sasser states,

I am tired of seeing our hard-earned tax dollars go to other places. I am weary of seeing over \$100 billion a year go to maintain a military establishment in Europe which, when I last looked, amounted to 280,000 U.S. troops, supported by tens of thousands of civilian employees. Why should they still be there defending Western Europe? The threat is gone. We ought to be talking about bringing them home in great quantities and investing the money the we spend in Europe here on our own people. The American people have borne the burden for half a century. We spend more of our gross national product year in and year out, twice as much as any other country in the free world, for a military to provide a shield for Germany, for Japan -- and we were glad to do that during the long, dark days of the Cold War. But the Cold War is over now. We bore the burden. We paid the price. We won.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Robert A. Levine, What if the Russians Aren't Coming and the Americans Aren't Staying, (Rand Corporation: 1991), p. 5.

¹⁰²Sasser cited in "Should S.2399 to Modify the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act be Approved," Congressional Digest, May 1992, p. 142.

Senator Tom Harkin believes that larger cuts in defense spending should be made now that the Cold War is over. He also believes that continued military spending at Cold War levels will do little to battle the new threats that exist. He states,

For the last 40 years, two generations of American gave their blood, their lives and spent \$12 trillion to fight the Cold War and defend the world from communism. But now the Cold War is over. And we won. Europe and Japan are rebuilt. We helped rebuild them. The Soviet Union is dead. We helped kill it. The Cold War is over, and continuing military spending at Cold War levels is senseless. Certainly military threats still exist, but now they are more likely to come from terrorist states, drug traffickers and ... the spread of nuclear weapons. And the massive military forces built up over the past four decades cannot help us solve the crises of the next decade. ..Aside from the President and some aggressive Pentagon planners, most Americans recognize that the United States has no major military rivals, and by all accounts it would take more than a decade for one to arise.¹⁰³

The above views have a foundation in the new realities. The immediate threat from the East is considered by most to be practically non-existent. Furthermore, Senator Harkin is correct in pointing out that future threats to European security stand a good chance of coming from terrorist states, drug traffickers, and the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the current European security situation should be further evaluated before the belief that Europe no longer faces a significant security threat is accepted as a basis for further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe.

¹⁰³Harkin cited in Ibid., p. 150.

The former Soviet Union is in a state of political, military, and economic upheaval. Even in its weakened condition, however, the strategic military capability of Russia remains a concern of Europe and the United States. Secretary of Defense Cheney wrote in February 1992, "There is no country capable of mounting a global military challenge to our security except with respect to strategic nuclear forces."¹⁰⁴ Secretary of State Baker expressed further concern about the residual strategic capability of Russia. In December 1991 Baker stated,

Economically, the old Soviet system has collapsed, multiplying every day the threats these reformer face--from social dislocation to political fragmentation to ethnic violence...Politically, the dangers of protracted anarchy and chaos are obvious. Great empires rarely go quietly into extinction. No one can dismiss the possibility that darker political forces lurk in the wings, representing the remnants of Stalinism or the birth of nationalist extremism or even fascism, ready to exploit the frustrations of a proud but exhausted people in their hour of despair. Strategically, both these alternatives--anarchy or reaction--could become threats to the West's vital interests when they shake a land that is still home to nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons and the most powerful arsenal of conventional weaponry ever amassed in Europe.¹⁰⁵

As the Baker statement suggests, building peace and stability within Russia and the other successor states will take time. These areas are caught up in

¹⁰⁴Cheney, February 1992, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992 draft, p. 15.

¹⁰⁵Baker, December 1991, cited in Ibid., p. 16.

ancient cultural and religious conflicts. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union has allowed the potential for free democratic states to form within the FSU, this disintegration has also allowed rivalries, which had previously been suppressed by the power of the Soviet Union, to resurface.

European leaders are aware that they cannot accurately predict the future of Russia and the other successor states. It is uncertain what form the future governments of Russia and the other successor states will take. Therefore, it is impossible to state with certainty that no future threat to Western Europe will arise in Russia and/or other former Soviet states. The dismal economic conditions in the FSU could disrupt the efforts of democratic forces. It is still possible that a nationalistic, militarized regime could gain control of Russia and other successor states. The possibility of a "Weimar Russia" that might seek to regain control of its former empire still exists.¹⁰⁶ With the chaos that exists within Russia and the other successor states of the former Soviet Union, an authoritarian regime might be welcomed as the restorer of order in a troubled society. Such a regime would most likely be anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-foreigner, and have massive military and particularly nuclear forces available to it.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶For further explanation of this term see the information presented under the previous heading of "The Future of Russia."

¹⁰⁷Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured World," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America, (New York, Plenum Press, 1992), p. 54.

The United States must realize that even many Russian "democrats" are not completely convinced about the value of Western principles of democracy. Many in Russia would be happy to part with democracy in exchange for food and other basic necessities.¹⁰⁸ Part of the intelligentsia in Russia, which opposed Communism, is motivated more by nationalistic concerns than by democracy.¹⁰⁹ Some members of the intelligentsia are coming to realize that democracy will be no more to their liking than Communism was. The ideas of democracy and capitalism are new, even to the Russians that support them. Furthermore, these ideas go against the values that form the core of Russian national consciousness. The intelligentsia have always believed that they constitute a natural social elite. It is possible that relatively few people today in Russia want Western-style democracy. The masses cry for food. The cultural elites want status. Many see democracy robbing them of these desires.¹¹⁰ While the 1990s may be a period of hope and promise for the emergence of stable democratic institutions in the FSU, for now there are no assurances. Until the situation in the FSU stabilizes, any action by the United States to drastically change its military commitment to NATO Europe may lead to regret. While Russian capabilities in the years to come remain uncertain, the U.S. must be prepared to face a formidable opponent.

¹⁰⁸Liah Greenfeld, "Kitchen Debate," The New Republic, September 21, 1992, p. 24.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 22.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 24.

Other issues draw the future security of Europe into question. For instance, who is in control of the nuclear weapons within the other successor states of the Soviet Union? According to William C. Potter, Director of the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, other Soviet successor states may also become autonomous nuclear powers, despite the May 1992 signing of the Lisbon protocol. Two key states where this possibility exists are Armenia and Ukraine. According to Potter, either of these states seeking to develop its own nuclear capability would hold ramifications for the START Treaty. Russia will most likely ratify START. However, Russia could refuse to implement START if the above situation occurs. Potter believes that Ukraine already has negative control over the nuclear weapons on its territory. This is because Ukraine pays the salaries of the crews manning the missiles. Furthermore, Ukraine is seeking to gain positive control by developing its own codes for arming and targeting the missiles.¹¹¹

Security threats to Western Europe still exist. Therefore, it is necessary that the United States maintain a significant commitment to European security. As Richard K. Betts states:

It is especially reckless at the moment to invest confidence in any particular estimate of why, how, and when things will go wrong. Major discontinuities in international relations are seldom predicted. Who would not have been

¹¹¹William C. Potter, "Ukraine's Nuclear Trigger," The New York Times, November 10, 1992, p. A15.

derided and dismissed in 1988 for predicting that within a mere three years Eastern Europe would be liberated, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union deposed, and the Union itself on the ash heap of history? Yet it is hard to believe that the probability of equally revolutionary negative developments, of economic crisis and ideological disillusionment with democracy, of scapegoating and instability leading to miscalculation, escalation, and war several years from now is lower than the probability of the current peace seemed several years ago.¹¹²

Perhaps Winston Churchill summed it up best when prior to World War I he said,

[War] is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the twentieth century...No one would do such things. Civilization has climbed above such perils. The interdependence of nations,...the sense of public law,...liberal principles,...Christian charity,...[and] common sense have rendered such nightmares impossible. However, adding rhetorically, Churchill asked: Are you quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong.¹¹³

B. DOES THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE "COST" THE U.S. TOO MUCH?

This issue may be summarized as follows:

Why should the United States be required to guarantee the security of Western Europe? Hasn't Europe changed? Can't it provide more for its own security? Shouldn't the United States stop bearing an unfair level of the Western European defense burden?

¹¹²Richard K. Betts, p. 14.

¹¹³Winston Churchill, cited in Colin L. Powell, "The American commitment to European security," Survival, Summer 1992, p. 11.

Representative Lee H. Hamilton believes the U.S. should make Europe pay more of the cost of its defense. Lee H. Hamilton states,

The United States also continues to bear a disproportionate share of common defense burdens. There is no longer any reason why the United States should devote a larger portion of its GDP to defense spending than its wealthy European and Asian allies. These countries are capable of paying more for their own defense and supplying their own troops to replace U.S. forces.¹¹⁴

Before the U.S. asks its European allies to pay their "fair share" for the security guarantee to Europe, the U.S. should evaluate the benefits its current commitment to the Atlantic Alliance provides. Furthermore, by what amount can the U.S. reduce its military presence in Europe before these benefits are lost?

Countering the Soviet threat was the main reason the U.S. maintained an influential military presence in Europe after World War II. Just as Europe has evolved over the past 40 years, so have U.S. reasons for maintaining forces and commitments on the continent. Since the late 1940s, the reasons U.S. military forces have been on European soil have evolved into implicit ones that are not closely related to the possibility of Soviet aggression advanced in official statements. The U.S. military presence has played two important roles separate from deterrence of the Soviet Union. A U.S. military presence in Europe serves as a general contribution to European security and gives America a place at the

¹¹⁴Lee H. Hamilton, p. 51.

European economic and political table. As the threat from the Soviet Union has declined, these two reasons have begun to dominate.¹¹⁵

America has played a pacifying role to Western Europe. The U.S. role as a guarantor of European stability has been underscored by NATO officials and parliamentarians. Canadian diplomat Jeremy K.B. Kinsman said, "There is a mystique to American arms that acts as a sedative in political crisis."¹¹⁶ The U.S. removed the cause of conflict in previous wars by removing the necessity for autonomous choice in matters of defense.¹¹⁷

Until the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, the search for security by Western European countries was often a catalyst for insecurity. Each country's search posed a threat to the others. "Because there is no ultimate guardian, states must assume the worst; because they act in terms of their worst assumptions, they excite the worst suspicions of their neighbors and rivals, whose countervailing responses merely serve to buttress the former countries' initial anxiety."¹¹⁸ The United States defused the ancient rivalries that led to past wars. The Soviet threat didn't extinguish these rivalries. It only overshadowed them.

¹¹⁵Robert A. Levine, Keeping U.S. Troops in Europe: The Real Reason Why, (Rand Corporation, September 1990), p. 7.

¹¹⁶Jeremy K.B. Kinsman, cited in Pat Towell, "Bush's Europe Troop Plan Faces Some Paring, Lawmakers Say," Congressional Quarterly, February 15, 1992, p. 360.

¹¹⁷Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p. 68.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

The U.S. at considerable cost has built an international order in Western Europe that has been stable, preserved the security and independence of its members, and has muted the use of force.¹¹⁹ While wars have battered the rest of the world for the past 40 years, Western Europe has remained largely at peace.

The great realization by Western leaders after two world wars has been that, unless America remains engaged with Europe in order to preserve stability, the U.S. might be required to restore equilibrium at a later date. This is no less true today than it was during the Cold War. According to Henry Kissinger, Germany has become so strong that by themselves other European countries cannot balance its power. Without the United States, Britain and France would lack the power to provide balance to Western Europe, and Germany would lack an anchor to keep nationalistic tensions and outside pressures in check.¹²⁰ The only reason France accepted German membership in NATO after World War II was because the U.S. and Britain guaranteed France against the dread consequences of Germany's resurgence.¹²¹ Once again, Germany has the potential ability to dominate Europe. Is the U.S. ready to accept the resurfacing of apprehensions among Europeans which have led to previous wars in Europe? As Joffe writes,

¹¹⁹Robert A. Levine, Keeping U.S. Troops in Europe: The Real Reason Why, p. 9.

¹²⁰Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," p. 5.

¹²¹Ibid.

"By extending its guarantee, the United States removed the prime structural cause of conflict among states--the search for an autonomous defense policy."¹²²

The U.S. must maintain an influential military presence in NATO Europe because its stake in Europe is most strongly represented by this presence.¹²³ This involvement gives the United States influence in European matters which are central to its national interest.

By maintaining an influential role in NATO the United States has access to the European economic and political table. The process of integration in the European Community is continuing. A more united Europe holds advantages and disadvantages for the United States. By uniting, Europe may allow the U.S. to reduce its military presence on the continent. European unity may also give the U.S. a stronger partner to work with in addressing various regional problems around the world.

However, some U.S. observers judge that the European Community, which will have a larger GNP than the U.S., is becoming a "fortress Europe." Richard Nixon states,

The closer post-1992 Europe comes, the more protectionist the European Community becomes. European companies received an average of \$115 billion a year in state subsidies during the 1980s, a practice that shows no signs of abating. Today, the annual subsidy for state-owned steel companies

¹²²Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p. 68.

¹²³Robert A. Levine, David A. Ochmanek, p. 12.

is \$225 million. If a ship is built with subsidized steel, the builder can get an additional 13 percent in shipbuilding subsidies from the community. Airbus, the European aerospace consortium, receives an estimated \$20 billion in subsidies, while Air France raked in \$400 million and the Belgian airline Sabena requested \$1 billion. Unless the European Community states to open its domestic markets, it is inevitable that the rest of the world will close theirs.¹²⁴

Evidence of discrimination against the United States by the European Community has been apparent from the beginning. According to Henry Kissinger,

Exterior barriers of a common market are by definition higher than its internal ones. During the postwar period the shared security concern caused these competing interests to take a back seat.¹²⁵

Richard Nixon argues that the U.S. role in NATO gives it a voice in European affairs:

The U.S. role in NATO gives us significant indirect leverage in addressing such issues as the Persian Gulf crisis and trade disputes. Without a military presence, we would have no voice in Europe.¹²⁶

¹²⁴Richard Nixon, Seize the Moment, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 122.

¹²⁵Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," p. 5.

¹²⁶Richard Nixon, "Is America A Part Of Europe," National Review, p. 26.

A final response to the argument that NATO offers little benefit to the United States can be found in the old saying, "a miser pays twice."¹²⁷ In other words, it costs less to maintain an adequate U.S. military presence in Europe in order to help insure peace on the continent than it would for the U.S. to rebuild its presence there if a future crisis were to arise. It is inevitable, given the manner in which the U.S. and other Western cultures are intermingled, that any future conflict in Western Europe would once again imply a U.S. military role. Furthermore, the interdependence of European economies, monetary systems, and financial markets, would mean that the economic cost to the U.S. of a future conflict could be quite large.¹²⁸

The Atlantic Alliance is the only international organization with the military command structure capable of adapting to a variety of situations both in Europe and abroad. Europeans trust the alliance and understand the need to keep the U.S. influential in NATO in order to insure European stability.¹²⁹ However, the U.S. military presence in Europe and involvement in NATO is a two-way street. It provides the United States with the ability to take part in European matters that affect U.S. national interests. NATO also provides the U.S. with a place at the

¹²⁷Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy, Fall 1992, p. 74.

¹²⁸Sam Nunn et. al., "The United States and NATO in an undivided Europe," Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991, p. 4.

¹²⁹Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, p. 122.

European economic and political table. This place will take on increasing importance as European unity looms closer on the horizon. Before further reductions are made to its military presence in Europe, the U.S. should evaluate how these reductions will affect its influence in Europe.

C. CAN THE U.S. BE PAID A "PEACE DIVIDEND"?

This issue can be summarized as follows:

The U.S. must be strong economically. In the future, national security will be determined by economic strength more than military might. It is important that the U.S. rebuild its economy and world competitiveness.

According to Representative Lee H. Hamilton,

U.S. economic performance is troubling. Economics can no longer take second place to national security in setting U.S. government policy.¹³⁰

The level of defense spending the U.S. maintained during the Cold War significantly added to the budget deficit. Senator Robert Byrd states,

We have to take a hard look at the defense budget because resources are scarce, the economy is in trouble, and we are losing in the international economic olympics. Fortunately for us, our long-time major world adversary has collapsed. We have been given a reprieve.... It is a sobering thing to contemplate how much we have become like our former adversary. The Soviet Union became a mighty military giant that siphoned all of its

¹³⁰Lee H. Hamilton, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," p. 35.

resources. It could not deal with change. It could not compete economically. It collapsed because of a huge inflexible military bureaucracy that, in the end, was not sustainable economically. We are headed down the same road.¹³¹

Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser feels that Bush's defense budget cuts are "token at best." They would only translate into approximately a \$4 billion reduction in spending in 1993. "Now I ask you, where's the peace dividend in that defense cut?" He also feels that failing to reduce defense spending more than is currently being called for over the next 5 years will hurt very desperately needed investment in the U.S.¹³²

Many in Congress support diverting the money saved from cuts in defense spending into the domestic economy. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell desires to cut defense to provide increased support for domestic programs. "We have an education system that isn't teaching, a health care system that isn't taking care of people, an infrastructure system that isn't permitting efficient transportation, and an unemployment insurance system that doesn't provide insurance to the unemployed."¹³³ According to Senator Paul David Wellstone,

¹³¹"Should S.2399 to Modify the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act be Approved," p. 144.

¹³²Pamela Fessler, "Economic Reality May Limit Hill's Urge To Outcut Bush," Congressional Quarterly, February 1, 1992, p. 253.

¹³³Pat Towell and George Hager, "Soviet Union's Disintegration Spurs Call for Defense Cuts" Congressional Quarterly, September 14, 1991, p 2631.

The redefinition of national security is not yet more bombs and missiles. It is not close to a \$300 billion military budget, albeit we have to have a strong defense. The redefinition of national security is the security of our local communities where people have jobs they can count on, jobs at decent wages with decent fringe benefits, where there is housing and people are not homeless, where there is a commitment one more time to an education second to none."¹³⁴

These views are rooted in new political and economic realities. The U.S. economic situation is troubling. The fact that economics is increasing in importance as military strength declines in importance further emphasizes the need to improve the U.S. economy in order to maintain the national security of the U.S. The United States faces additional domestic problems which will have to be addressed in the coming years. It is obvious that the U.S. should improve its infrastructure, reduce unemployment, help the homeless, and improve its education system. The question is whether cuts in defense spending would necessarily have a significant effect on the U.S. domestic situation and any of the problems cited above. The support for a peace dividend to be gained by cuts in defense spending appears to be valid. Surely by cutting defense spending and diverting the savings into the economy, it is argued, the U.S. domestic situation would improve.

Further examination of this issue is necessary, however. The first problem with this reasoning is that cuts in defense spending won't produce any real savings

¹³⁴"Should S.2399 to Modify the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act be Approved," p. 144.

for some time. Rep. Jon Kyl claims that those who expect huge savings from defense are mistaken. It takes money to close down military bases and to dismantle nuclear warheads.¹³⁵ The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) echoes Kyl's opinion when it states that destroying nuclear warheads will only save \$5 billion dollars between 1992 and 1997. It adds that the significant savings will not start until the year 2001.¹³⁶

Another problem with the peace dividend logic is that currently the defense budget is only 18% of the federal budget. While even steps towards deficit reduction will help, even the largest of the proposed defense cuts would have only a minimal effect. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, states, "We should get rid of the notion floating around that by cutting defense we can get our national debt under control."¹³⁷ Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns that even if the defense budget were cut in half, to 9% of the federal budget, the nation's budget problems cannot be resolved without trimming other federal programs. Adm. Jeremiah also warns that cutting defense too much will result in the U.S. no longer having the high-

¹³⁵Kyl cited in Rick Maze, "Politics, economy may mean deeper defense cuts," Air Force Times, January 6, 1992, p. 32.

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Pamela Fessler, "Armed Services Panels Begin to Ponder Spending Plans," p. 417.

technology force that enabled the U.S. to perform so well in the Persian Gulf.¹³⁸

Senators John W. Warner and Sam Nunn hold that many congressmen are looking for the defense budget to solve the nation's economic problems without considering what the cuts would do to national defense.¹³⁹

Indeed, some proponents of the "peace dividend" argument may not understand what effect large cuts in defense spending would have on the American economy. Aides to Senate Democratic leaders report that lawmakers are finding it difficult to agree on how large defense cuts should be. This is not easy because cuts in defense spending will hurt local economies. Due to the detrimental effect President Bush's cuts have had on the defense industry and the poor state of the economy, Congress is hesitant to make further cuts in the defense budget.¹⁴⁰ Sam Nunn calls estimates that even under Bush's proposal 2 million military and civilian workers will lose their jobs, "very sobering." Ranking House Budget Committee Republican Bill Gradison has said that some in Congress were already in a "state of shock" over what the proposed cuts in defense spending would do to their districts.¹⁴¹ Gordon Adams, director of the

¹³⁸William Matthews, "Defense Cuts Won't Pay Off, Jeremiah Says," Army Times, January 6, 1992, p. 4.

¹³⁹Sam Nunn, cited in Pamela Fessler, "Armed Services Panels Begin To Ponder Spending Plans," p 417.

¹⁴⁰Pat Towell, "Stormy Debate Ahead On Threat, Response," Congressional Quarterly, September 26, 1992, p. 2894.

¹⁴¹Pamela Fessler, p. 253.

Defense Budget Project, feels that Congress is between a "rock and a hard place." Members of Congress want a peace dividend but they don't want it to hurt their districts.¹⁴²

It is obvious that cuts in defense spending will not solve the nation's economic problems. Even if the savings gained from reducing the defense budget were applied to purposes other than deficit reduction, it would not be a significant amount for many years. Furthermore, the short-term effects of defense cuts are likely to do more harm than good to local economies. Upon closer inspection, the "peace dividend" appears to be more of a "pipe dream."

The U.S. may already have received its "peace dividend." However, this dividend may be difficult to measure in dollars. The U.S. military presence in Europe has provided almost a half century of peace on a continent that in previous years was battered by war. As previously mentioned, this peace has brought security and prosperity to the U.S. Furthermore, the level of defense spending the U.S. pursued during the Cold War allowed it to create a military force second to none. As long as this force is not destroyed in pursuit of savings that may not exist, the U.S. military will continue to provide security for the U.S. in the coming years. This security will provide the United States with the ability to further prosper and improve its domestic situation without fear of weakness against future adversaries.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 256.

D. DOES EUROPE WANT A U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE?

Given the confusion in the U.S. about the level of military presence it should maintain in Europe, maybe the U.S. should ask Europe if it wants U.S. forces there. European voices of opposition to a U.S. military presence in Europe are calling for the U.S. to remove its troops. Josef Joffe has referred to "the more extreme voices of the European peace movement, whose deepest dreams dovetail nicely with the retractionist ambitions of the American critics: If Europe could only push back the superpowers, the entire continent would live in tranquility ever after."¹⁴³

As both sides of the Atlantic evaluate their new security needs now that the Cold War is over, European public opinion will play an important role. Therefore, it is important to evaluate West European public opinion as it relates to the United States and its role in the post-Cold War world.

In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to ask several questions. How much anti-American sentiment exists among Europeans? Has the diminished threat to Europe resulted in an increase in anti-Americanism? How do Europeans view the continued presence of American forces?

As the 1990s begin, the overall European attitude towards the United States remains favorable. In most European countries, anti-American attitudes are only held by a small percentage of people.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p 65.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

Throughout the 1980s anti-Americanism was the view of only a limited minority in most West European countries, with only 15 to 25% holding anti-American/unfavorable/bad attitudes of the United States. The level of anti-American feelings was higher than this only in Britain, Greece, Spain, and Turkey. More-over, pro-American/favorable/good feelings were consistently the pre-dominant view during the 1980s except in Greece and Spain.¹⁴⁵

The majority of Europeans feel the U.S. should not withdraw from its security arrangements with Europe. Furthermore, Europeans want a continued U.S. military presence on their continent.¹⁴⁶ More than half of all Europeans in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy indicated in May 1991 that, with regard to security matters, their countries' interests were similar to those of the United States. Only Spain considered these interests to be dissimilar.¹⁴⁷

West European leaders have also emphasized the need for a continued U.S. military presence in a strong security alliance with Europe. In fact, West Europeans believe that the continuation of U.S. involvement in European security matters is important and that NATO is essential to their security interests. They are in favor of the continued presence of U.S. troops on European soil.¹⁴⁸ The reason why Europe is not ready to ask the U.S. to completely withdraw its military

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

presence is that Europeans remain influenced by several fears. These fears include the fear of war, fear of Germany, and fear of change.

Fear of nuclear and conventional war has been a primary purpose for Europeans wanting an American military presence on their continent for the past 40 years. "The U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe is a key element in U.S. and European security, and the presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe has long been regarded as needed to make that commitment manifest."¹⁴⁹ Therefore, if the U.S. withdraws from Europe, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee would be brought into question. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the threat of an East-West nuclear war in Europe has decreased considerably. However, even with a greatly reduced threat of nuclear war from the FSU, the presence of an American nuclear guarantee has helped insure that other European countries such as "Germany, Italy, or Czechoslovakia" will not seek to become nuclear powers.¹⁵⁰

Significant numbers of Europeans also share a fear of Germany. They do not fear a renewal of military aggression or Nazism, but rather the economic and political powerhouse that a reunified Germany might develop into. The U.S. military presence in Germany and Europe provides a balance to the economic, political, and military power of Germany, with politically important psychological

¹⁴⁹Walter B. Slocombe, p. 62.

¹⁵⁰Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, p. 13.

effects. The presence of American troops in Europe provides a symbol of participation from "a nation with more than three times the population and GNP of even a reunified Germany."¹⁵¹ NATO's contribution to European security remains indispensable. NATO relates America to Europe and Germany to America. The American military presence reassures Europeans about Germany's future, because Germany has incentives to be a reliable ally in NATO.¹⁵²

All these fears can be summed up as the fear of change. The American military presence in Europe has promoted freedom, prosperity, and economic and political integration. The fear of change could bring about the renewal of old rivalries and suspicions. This could increase European instability, which is not in the interests of the United States. Helmut Kohl stated in June 1992 that,

We Germans, we Europeans, want to further expand the transatlantic partnership. Europe still needs America - and I would add, America needs Europe...Ladies and gentlemen, America's and Canada's role in and responsibility for Europe are of vital importance for peace and security on our continent - and particularly for united Germany at its core. The indispensable security link between Europe and North America is and remains the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁵²Henry A. Kissinger, "The All European Security System," The Baltimore Sun, 16 April 1990, p. 15A

¹⁵³Helmut Kohl, "Europe Still Needs North America," Vital Speeches of the Day, June 1, 1992, p. 484.

V. OVERALL VIEWS FROM WASHINGTON

Versions of the above views can be found in all corners of the United States. However, the debate has been especially heated in Washington. The next Administration will face the challenge of defining "a vision for the United States and the role it will play in a dramatically changed world."¹⁵⁴ The Clinton Administration will have to make it clear that the U.S. is facing a moment in history where domestic and foreign policy are inseparable. Former U.S. Ambassador to China, Winston Lord, said on the changing American role, "foreign policy begins at home and requires a strong America; that a strong America, in turn, depends on creative leadership abroad."¹⁵⁵

Will President Clinton make significant changes to the Bush Administration's defense drawdown plans? How is the U.S. military being restructured to face the challenges that lie ahead? How large will the U.S. defense budget be in the coming years? What will the composition of U.S. military forces be?

¹⁵⁴Pamela Fessler, "Beyond the Campaign," Congressional Quarterly, September 26, 1992, p. 2887.

¹⁵⁵Winston Lord, cited in Pamela Fessler, "Beyond the Campaign," p. 2887.

A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN

"These cuts are deep," President Bush announced in his 1992 State of the Union address. "You must know my resolve, this deep and no deeper."¹⁵⁶ Bush's plan for military reductions is designed to reduce the U.S. defense budget without reducing the quality of the United States military. In the past, after winning major wars, the U.S. dismantled its military forces with disastrous results.¹⁵⁷

On October 6, 1992, President Bush signed the \$254 billion fiscal year 1993 defense appropriations bill. This bill will increase the speed with which reductions are made in the U.S. defense budget. While hardware programs bear the brunt of the reduction, the bill cuts operating costs and weapons procurement programs as well. Although the Pentagon's purchasing power has decreased for several years, 1992 will mark the first sharply significant reduction in absolute terms in defense spending since the mid-1970s.¹⁵⁸ As a percentage of GNP, the defense budget is dropping from a peak of 6.3 percent during the Reagan buildup to 3.4 percent by 1997. Bush's plan makes large reductions and cancellations to

¹⁵⁶Bush cited in Rick Maze, "Congress: Cut More," Army Times, February 10, 1992, p. 14.

¹⁵⁷David E. Jeremiah, "The Cold War's End Does Not Guarantee Peace," Defense Issues, Vol. 6 No. 42.

¹⁵⁸Pat Towell, "Bill Shaves Personnel Spending But Slices Weapons Purchases," Congressional Quarterly, October 17, 1992, p. 3260.

programs and modifications through 1997 rather than making large cuts in military personnel.¹⁵⁹

For instance, only two of the previously planned 12 Seawolf attack submarines costing \$33.6 billion will be built. President Bush had asked that only one be produced but Congress insisted on two.¹⁶⁰ Additional savings would result from the unilateral nuclear force initiatives the President announced in his January 1992 State of the Union message. Production of the B-2 stealth bomber being stopped at 20 planes would save \$14.5 billion, cancellation of the Midgetman nuclear missile would save \$1 billion, and ending production of the advanced cruise missile at 640 instead of 1,000 would save \$1.3 billion. Production of the Trident II missile would continue. However, production would be stopped on the W-88 warhead.¹⁶¹

The Pentagon hopes to achieve further savings by taking more time to move systems from the research and design stage to production. A few systems that would be affected by this new approach would be the Army's Comanche

¹⁵⁹David C. Morrison, "Pentagons On A Downward Glide Path," National Journal, February 1, 1992, p. 279.

¹⁶⁰Pat Towell, "Bill Shaves Personnel Spending But Slices Weapons Purchases," p. 3264.

¹⁶¹Pat Towell and Andrew Taylor, "Aspin, Cheney Spar Face-To-Face But Stay Far Apart on Budget," Congressional Quarterly, February 8, 1992, p. 322.

helicopter, the Army's Block III tank and LOSAT antitank missile, the Air Force's Advanced Air to Air Missile, and the Navy's undersea surveillance system.¹⁶²

The President's plan requested approximately \$6 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, Congress only approved \$4.1 billion of Bush's request. The budget also contains a companion air defense program to be developed against the threat of bombers and long-range cruise missiles and \$25 million for an anti-satellite missile (ASAT).¹⁶³

Regarding personnel cuts, Bush's plan would result in 500,000 service members, 500,000 federal civilians, and about 1 million workers in the defense industry, losing their jobs during the next five years.¹⁶⁴ Army active duty and reserve divisions would be cut from 26 in 1991 to 18 in 1995, Navy ships would be reduced from 530 to 450, and tactical Air Force wings would be reduced from 34 to 26.¹⁶⁵ Overall, Bush's five-year defense plan would end in 1997 and cost \$1.43 trillion. The result would be a U.S. military that is 25% smaller than it was in 1990.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶²David C. Morrison, "Pentagons On A Downward Glide Path," National Journal, p. 280.

¹⁶³Pat Towell, "Bill Shaves Personnel Spending But Slices Weapons Purchases," p. 3263.

¹⁶⁴Rick Maze, "Budget Battle Joined," Army Times, February 10, 1992, p. 3.

¹⁶⁵David C. Morrison, "Pentagons On A Downward Glide Path," National Journal, p. 280.

¹⁶⁶Pat Towell, "Stormy Debate Ahead On Threat Response," Congressional Quarterly, September 26, 1992, p. 2894.

B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

What modifications to Bush's Base Force Plan can be expected from the Clinton Administration? Clinton and Bush agree that the military of the post-Cold War era should be a much smaller force. While Bush's plan called for the active duty military to be reduced from 1.9 million down to 1.6 million troops by 1995, Clinton has stated plans of going beyond and making an additional 200,000 cut in force levels. However, Clinton has stated that he will not shrink military force levels faster, but instead would continue the drawdown for two additional years cutting 100,000 personnel each year.¹⁶⁷

President Bush has called for military spending to be at \$1.42 trillion through 1997, while Clinton is calling for this number to be further reduced to \$1.36 trillion for the same period. Most of the difference in spending would be gained from further troop reductions and cuts to SDI.¹⁶⁸ President Bush is in favor of strong missile defenses. Clinton is in favor of missile defense, including improved Patriot missiles, but plans to cut \$15-\$20 billion from the Bush Administration's proposed \$37 billion for SDI research, mainly from space-based weapons. Clinton would further slow development of a ground-based missile defense system until a clear need is seen.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷William Matthews, "Powell 'not locked into base force'," Air Force Times, November 30, 1992, p. 18.

¹⁶⁸Eric Schmitt, p. A14.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

While calling for further reductions, Clinton agrees with the current Administration that the quality and ability of the U.S. military in the coming years must be preserved. Clinton stated on September 15, "Our forces must be more mobile, more precise and more flexible, and they must have the technologically advanced weapons they need to prevail and to prevail quickly."¹⁷⁰

Both Bush and Clinton agree that military forces will be increasingly U.S.-based in the coming years. While President Bush's plan called for the level of troops in Europe to be reduced to 150,000 after 1995, Clinton believes this number can be further reduced to between 75,000 and 100,000.¹⁷¹

The Clinton Administration plans to make further reductions in the composition of U.S. military forces. Clinton has stated intentions to cut the number of aircraft carriers from the 12 proposed by President Bush to 10. Clinton has not stated intentions to further reduce the number of Army divisions from 12 or Air Force fighter wings from 26 that President Bush's plan called for.¹⁷²

Clinton favors development of new advanced weapons systems in order to keep the U.S. military technologically superior to the rest of the world. Systems

¹⁷⁰Governor Bill Clinton cited in Eric Schmitt, "Clinton and Bush Agree on Trimming Armed Forces, but Their Paths Vary," The New York Times, October 21, 1992, p. A14.

¹⁷¹Eric Schmitt, p. A14.

¹⁷²ibid.

which Clinton supports include the F-22 fighter, C-17 transport, and V-22 Osprey.¹⁷³

Clinton and Bush also agree on the strategy of developing prototypes of weapons systems while delaying full scale production until a clear need is demonstrated.¹⁷⁴ However, some concern has been raised over this strategy in Congress and the defense industry. Senator Malcolm Wallop has argued that any new systems which are not actually produced and used are "nothing more than interesting science projects, not practical solutions."¹⁷⁵ On this same subject, Loren B. Thompson, Deputy Director of National Security Studies at Georgetown University, has warned that cutting the defense budget too deeply would spell the end of the defense industry. If the Pentagon shifted to an acquisition system where production is carried out slowly, if at all, it would risk the loss of most of the nation's defense production capacity and workers. Such a situation would place a greater reliance on commercial sources of equipment and reduce the U.S. ability to export its weapons systems.¹⁷⁶

How has the Bush Administration attempted to ease the blow of the defense drawdown on local economies? How will the Clinton Administration approach this topic? President Bush has relied mainly on existing government agencies to assist

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵Wallop cited in Kevin Howe, pp. C1-2.

¹⁷⁶David A. Bond, p. 24.

civilian and military personnel who will lose their jobs and communities that will be faced with factory and base closings. However, these present agencies may be inadequate to deal with the flow of workers that will flood an already weak economy.¹⁷⁷ The Clinton Administration states that it will devote Federal money to "communication, transportation, new environmental technology, and other infrastructure projects." in order to assist in finding jobs for those workers affected by defense cuts.¹⁷⁸

There is some disagreement between Bush and Clinton about how to proceed in reducing the U.S. defense budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe. However, the overall changes that the Clinton Administration will make to President Bush's plan will probably be small. "The shape, size and mission of the armed forces in the future would not be radically different under Republican or Democratic administrations."¹⁷⁹ As Georgetown University's National Security Studies Program has concluded, "A Clinton Presidency would not fundamentally alter the current content of U.S. national security policies."¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷Eric Schmitt, p. A14.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Ibid.

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

C. CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS REGARDING THE FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES

Members from both parties in Congress are calling for the U.S. to reevaluate its defense needs in the new security environment. Lee H. Hamilton believes the issues are no longer Communist expansion or the nuclear threat. Instead, the U.S. needs to deal with the problems of "economic competitiveness, weapons proliferation, support for democracy, protection of the environment, and the fight against human misery." Hamilton believes the U.S. needs to redefine its role in the world.¹⁸¹

In a period when congressmen see their local districts absorbing the shock of defense drawdowns, many are intensifying their calls for a reduction of U.S. involvement in European security affairs. Politicians are finding it hard to justify keeping troops overseas when bases, such as Williams Air Force Base in Arizona, are being closed, with economic harm to their districts. Some of these feelings are understandable. Washington is paying more each year to maintain the U.S. military presence overseas even though this money insures access to fewer bases. Host nations are demanding more money as compensation for a U.S. military presence. Foreign aid relating to military bases has risen from \$200 million annually in 1974 to roughly \$2 billion in 1990. If the situation were not changing, the U.S. would be paying close to \$3 billion for its foreign military presence by the

¹⁸¹Lee H. Hamilton, p. 32.

mid-1990's.¹⁸² Therefore, Congress is generally in favor of additional cuts to U.S. force levels in Europe. Senator Tom Harkin notes that 60% of the Pentagon's budget was to be directed toward the U.S. commitment to NATO. "That is about \$160 billion a year that we are spending to stop an attack by a military force that no longer exists led by a country that no longer exists."¹⁸³ While not favoring total withdrawal, many congressmen want a greater detachment from the U.S. commitment to Europe.

The discussion surrounding the required level of U.S. commitment to European security will likely continue for some time. During this period the U.S. military presence in Europe will definitely change. While the exact figures are still under debate, it is inevitable that the U.S. military presence in Europe and its defense budget will be sharply reduced over the next several years. However, it is doubtful Congress will seek deeper cuts than what Clinton is planning to implement. Congress appears hesitant to cut more because of the economy's weak state and the detrimental effect that Bush's cuts have already had on the defense industry and local communities.¹⁸⁴

Senate Armed Services Committee member William S. Cohen, R-Maine, agrees with the level of military presence in Europe that Clinton has endorsed.

¹⁸²David C. Morrison, "Bringing Them Home," p. 2954.

¹⁸³Harkin cited in Pat Towell and George Hager, p. 2633.

¹⁸⁴Pat Towell, "Stormy Debate Ahead On Threat, Response," Congressional Quarterly, September 26, 1992, p. 2894.

Cohen believes even keeping 75,000 to 100,000 troops will have to be defended, however. Cohen has said that the American people have to be convinced that a continued U.S. military presence is necessary.¹⁸⁵ Cohen and other legislators have described the difficulty in gaining support for the U.S. role as a guarantor of European security in the current political climate. Cohen states, "The lamps of history are being extinguished by the winds of recession and unemployment."¹⁸⁶

If 100,000 to 125,000 is the maximum number of U.S. troops that will be stationed in Europe, how low can the American military presence shrink while still providing a believable commitment? The number of troops necessary in order to provide a believable commitment cannot be determined with precision. Some argue that keeping a U.S. military presence in Europe is more important than its actual operational capabilities.¹⁸⁷ From this viewpoint, a reasonable figure for the lower limit would be 50,000 troops located in several garrisons and air bases. These troops would act as a "tripwire" and provide a foundation for the return of a larger force, if it should be deemed necessary.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵Cohen cited in Pat Towell, "Bush's Europe Troop Plan Faces Some Paring, Lawmakers Say," p. 360.

¹⁸⁶Ibid.

¹⁸⁷Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, p. 15.

¹⁸⁸Robert A. Levine, What If the Russians Aren't Coming and the Americans Aren't Staying, p. 6.

D. PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTS A U.S. GLOBAL ROLE.

Much analysis has been done to understand how Congress, the Bush Administration, and the Clinton Administration are reshaping U.S. foreign policy. However, less study has been devoted to showing how these changes interact with the buildup of a strong desire in the American public to change the status quo. The American public is expressing mistrust, anxiety, and a determination to change government.¹⁸⁹ The desire for change in the U.S. public has the potential to affect the changes being made in U.S. foreign and defense policy.

By choosing and influencing Presidents and legislators, the U.S. public has an indirect ability to affect U.S. defense policy. Also, Congress is vulnerable to lobbying by interest groups. Since Congress, especially the House of Representatives, is driven to a large extent by public opinion, studying public opinion on national security matters and the defense budget might help shed light on what Congress will be motivated to do. Since the public could be considered uninformed and therefore unqualified regarding national security issues, some might argue that its opinions should not be trusted. However, the point can be made that most elected Representatives are merely members of the public with roughly the same level of knowledge about defense policy as their constituents.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹Daniel Yankelovich, "Foreign Policy After the Election," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, p. 1.

¹⁹⁰Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Democratizing U.S. Defense Policy, Prepared for Delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 through September 2, 1990, p. 3.

Furthermore, recent studies regarding the role of public opinion in U.S. arms debates show the public to be relatively aware of the issues.¹⁹¹ The growth of the media and television news deserves part of the credit for making defense issues more prominent. In the 1960s, growing concern for the economy created even greater public interest in national defense issues.¹⁹² An overview of recent polls of the American public provides interesting information about the public's feelings towards the Former Soviet Union, NATO, American military strength, and the role of the U.S. in the changing international security environment.

American public opinion varies widely given the issue being surveyed. Public opinion goes from a "raw opinion" or "knee jerk" type of reaction at one extreme to a responsible informed opinion at the other. "Raw opinion" views are expressed when the public has taken little time to evaluate and investigate the issues. The public has not evaluated the trade-offs and choices necessary in making a responsible judgement on the matter. Fortunately, in matters of defense and foreign policy, the public has become better informed. The experience of two world wars and the Cold War has given the American public time to evaluate the options and weigh the pros and cons of the major foreign policy issues.¹⁹³

The attention that Pat Buchanan received with his "America First" slogan led many observers to believe that Americans were becoming increasingly isolationist

¹⁹¹Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁹³Daniel Yankelovich, p. 6.

in their views towards foreign policy. At first glance, public opinion polls seemed to echo this belief. However, upon closer examination, underneath U.S. public opinion calling for greater attention to be given to domestic problems there is a strong commitment to internationalism. Strong majorities (71 percent) feel that America must take an active part in world affairs.¹⁹⁴

Regarding the breakup of the Soviet Union, Americans are concerned about nuclear control issues. Americans support U.S. cuts in nuclear forces and hope that the FSU will do the same. However, Americans feel that the FSU cannot be trusted without formal treaties.¹⁹⁵

With regard to NATO and U.S. military strength, even though a majority of Americans agree that the Cold War is over, they feel the U.S. must still be on guard. By a majority of 5 to 1 Americans believe that the U.S. should maintain its alliance with Western Europe. Regarding U.S. military strength, Americans consider the U.S. to be strong militarily and want it to stay that way. Ninety-one percent view the U.S. as the preeminent military power in the world. A majority of U.S. citizens, sixty-seven percent, are satisfied with the current levels of spending on national defense. Looking twenty-five years into the future, eighty percent see it important for the U.S. to have the strongest military forces in the

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁹⁵Richard J. Cattani, "America in the World," The Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1992, p. 18.

world.¹⁹⁶ On the role of the U.S. in the changing security environment, "public support for using American troops in crisis situations continues to be selective."¹⁹⁷ Americans favor using U.S. troops if a crisis should arise in Western Europe but they are reluctant to provide support for their use elsewhere. However, there are two exceptions. Americans would favor using U.S. troops to repel an invasion of South Korea by North Korea or an Arab attack on Israel.¹⁹⁸

In a Gallup Poll published in October of 1991, about fifty percent of Americans felt defense spending was too high, thirty-six percent felt it was the right amount, while ten percent felt it was too little, and four percent of Americans had no opinion. These figures may be compared with those in an August of 1990 poll which resulted in forty-one percent of Americans saying defense spending was too high, forty percent saying it was the right amount, fifteen percent feeling it was too low, with four percent again having no opinion.¹⁹⁹

E. THE INFORMED PUBLIC

Perhaps one the most beneficial sources of data was a Gallup poll performed between October 23 and November 15, 1990. The Gallup organization conducted

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷John E. Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the 90s," Foreign Policy, Spring 1991, p. 89.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Larry Hugick, "The Peace Dividend," The Gallup Poll Monthly, October 1991, p. 10.

a survey in which 1,662 men and women were surveyed, along with 377 leaders from the Bush Administration, Congress, international business, labor, the media, academic and religious organizations, and special interest groups. Findings of this survey were supplemented by Gallup polls conducted in January 1991. This poll provides an effective analysis of how the feelings of the average American compare with those of political, religious and economic leaders in the United States on issues of foreign policy. These surveys found sharp differences in some areas between public opinion and that of the "attentive public".²⁰⁰

One area of agreement between the two groups was the Soviet Union. Both groups felt that the threat from the Soviet Union has receded over the past few years. They no longer view the Soviet Union as the principal adversary of the United States, as they did four years ago.²⁰¹

Both groups feel that the U.S. should continue to play an active role in world affairs. However, a growing sense of economic vulnerability has both groups divided on the issue of whether the U.S. plays a more important role in world affairs now than it did 10 years ago. Both groups believe that, because the U.S. has been unable to solve its pressing economic problems, it has declined as a world power.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ John E. Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the 90s," Foreign Policy, Spring 1991, p. 81.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 80.

²⁰² Ibid.

The two groups expressed differing opinions on some issues. Each group was asked to identify the two or three biggest U.S. foreign policy problems. The mass public did not place the U.S.-Russian relationship within the top ten. However, leaders placed the U.S.-Russian relationship third. Even this reflects a 25% drop in importance from four years ago.²⁰³

Even with the current preoccupation in the U.S. over domestic issues, public opinion showed almost two thirds (62%) favoring a continued strong U.S. role in the world. This figure was down only slightly from four years ago. The American public seems to be increasingly aware that global interdependence has grown and makes a major impact on the overall economy at home.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, 30% of the public and 41% of the leaders expressed the feeling that future economic competition with Europe will become a threat to the United States.²⁰⁵

Public opinion is in favor of cutting the defense budget and reducing the U.S. military presence overseas. Late in 1990, 53% of the public wanted to maintain defense spending at the current level, 12% felt it needed to be increased, and 32% were in favor of reducing it. A poll of the leadership in America indicated that 21% wanted to keep defense spending the same, 2% wished to expand it, and 77% wanted to cut it back.²⁰⁶

²⁰³Ibid., p. 83.

²⁰⁴Ibid., p. 83.

²⁰⁵Ibid., p. 86.

²⁰⁶Ibid.

Regarding NATO, 56% of the American public want to preserve the present level of commitment and 22% want to reduce it. However, in polling the leadership, 35% express the desire to maintain the present level of commitment to NATO and 57% are in favor of reducing it. These figures reflect the impact the end of the Cold War has had on public opinion towards foreign policy.²⁰⁷

When given alternative levels of troop strengths in Europe to choose from, the American public was in favor of maintaining approximately 181,300 troops in Europe. The leaders favored a greater decrease in overseas presence; they expressed the desire for an average level of 101,200 personnel. Only a small percentage of the American public and leaders favors drastic changes to either extreme regarding the U.S. military presence in Europe or cuts in defense spending.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, contrary to claims made by some congressmen, little support was found in the opinion surveys for having Germany or Japan increase their military roles. While there is support for decreasing the U.S. troop commitment to Europe, 59% of the public and 65% of the leaders are against Japan or Germany increasing their military capabilities.²⁰⁹

These polls show an American public that is inclined to cautiously regard the Former Soviet Union. The public believes that the threat from the FSU is declining as long as certain guarantees and enforceable restrictions can be placed upon

²⁰⁷ibid., p. 89.

²⁰⁸ibid.

²⁰⁹ibid., p. 91.

Russia and the other successor states. Americans judge that it is important to retain the nation's overseas alliances. They believe that the U.S. should use these alliances to deal with major security threats. Americans favor reducing the defense budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe as long as the U.S. is able to remain the strongest military power in the world. However, the American public is against Japan or Germany increasing its military power to "pick up the slack."

Will public opinion on these issues be loud enough for Congress to hear? The lack of a clear threat to U.S. national security could answer this question. Without the perception of a threat, public opinion as a motivating force in Washington may grow weaker in the future.²¹⁰

²¹⁰Sean M. Lynn-Jones, p. 30.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is important that the U.S. be steadfast during the transition that is taking place in Europe. 1989 was seen as a new beginning for Europe. The tendency might surface among impatient analysts or policy-makers to speed the process of change, regardless of the pitfalls that may be present. However, this attitude could endanger the stable transition to a free and prosperous Europe. After peace dividends were harvested and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Europe, it would require massive effort and expense to return forces to Europe should it become necessary. Steps must be taken positively and decisively with an awareness that they cannot be easily reversed.

While some might argue that history doesn't repeat itself and that Europe has learned from past mistakes, certain themes in history have a way of reappearing in changing guises.²¹¹ "Although expensive, deterring war is cheaper than having to fight one."²¹² Though costly, America's European investment has yielded enormous benefits. It has provided years of peace on a continent that, in an ever-shrinking world, plays a critical role in the national security of the United States.

²¹¹Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," p. 76.

²¹²Ibid., p. 82.

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